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’’Independence for a nation is the same 
as a freedom for an individual” 
Baron Jozsef Eötvös
S u rvey  o f  th e  P olitica l situ ation
On April 16th, 1865 there appeared a newspaper article whose author -  even though 
the writer did not sign it -  everybody knew was non other than Ferenc Deâk. Deâk was 
the ranking individual domestic political leader of Hungarian public opinion opposed 
to the Habsburg Absolutism which had come to power after 1849. The publicatoin was 
significant becasue this was the first public declaration by Deâk -  and with him a 
segment of Hungarian liberals -  of the establishment of an Austro-Hungarian Com­
promise. Until 1865 not only Deâk, but most of the Hungarian political leadership (apart 
from the small group of conservatives) considered themselves believes in personal 
union between Austria and Hungary on the basis of the April Laws of 1848. That is, 
apart from the ruling group, they clung to national independence. Naturally there were 
differences among Hungarian politicians with respect whether they considered the 
requirements of the laws accepted by the ruler, and of the resolutions following from 
these laws, as maxima or minima. Many wanted to proceed further in the directio which 
1849 had signified; they desired to dethrone the House of Habsburg. In spite of different 
aspirations, however, the desire and necessity of coming out against absolutism 
produced a common platform in the form of adherence to the laws of 1848. This was 
exemplified by the 1861 Parliament, which in the end did not conclude any compromise 
with absolutism; and it was precisely Ferenc Deâk who -  giving form to the desire of 
the whole Parliament -  swore an oath on the inviolability of the nation’s constitutional 
laws.1
With respect to this standpoint and situation, the 1865 formulatio signified a
'Deâk Ferenc mâsodik folirati javaslata (Feren Deâk's second representational proposal) In: Deâk Ferenc 
beszédei (The Speeches of Ferenc Deâk 1861-1866, compiled by Manâ Kônyi. Budapest, 1903. p.220-275.)
qualitatively new element. Referring to the 1723 law, the Pragmatic Sanction, it said 
the following: "There (that is, in the law) the commonwealth of the ruling house, its 
inalienable and indivisible territory, and the common defense which follows naturally 
from this, was resolved.”'
Not much later, in May of 1865, a three-part article in the conservatives’ Vienna 
paper stated precisely the formulation of the compromise. Even though all this again 
happened anonymously insiders knew well, that it was Deäk’s view which had won the 
day. Referring to the commonality of defense, it established that this was two-fold: in 
peace and in war, that is, diplomatic and military. The ruler was the supreme commander 
of the army; the necessary raising of récrits for the common defense was the right of 
the Parliament.2 3
A strange, heterogeneous situation developed. Hungarian public opinion was not 
aware of the articles in Debatte (the Vienna newspaper) entirety, for the part containing 
the concrete solution dedicated to realization of conceptions (was not even published) 
in Hungary. At the same time a significant number of pamphlets containing other ideas, 
was in circulation. The representatives elected to the Parliament convoked for the end 
of 1865 usually presented their voters a program based on the 1861 position, thus even 
the 6-7% of the population comprising the electorate were not fully informed the course 
of political events. More accurately put, the country knew that a compromise was being 
prepared, and did not oppose it. But they were informed such a way that they did not 
know about the provisions which served as basis for the compromise and which is 
essential principles reduced national autonomy.4 *And a good part of the elested 
representatives were in the same boat as well, for there "footsoldiers of politics” were 
essentially only informed after the fact about the decisions taken.3 Thus in opposition 
to a softening absolutism, there was on the one hand less need to subordinate everything 
to ’’solidarity”; on the other hand, the political forces which carried opposing opinions 
were not able publicly to become polarized.
In essence, it was in the course of 1866 that the terms contained in the compromise 
and the possible consequences became clear to the representatives. At the same time it 
became obvious -  and in this defeat suffered by Austria at Königgratz at the hands of 
the Prussians had a large role -  absolutism was no longer maintainable with any 
instruments. With this then a wider field opened to the domestic political polarization 
which was coming into existence on the basis of relationship to the Compromise. Partise 
came into being in the house of representatives according to the norms of Europe at the 
time, but such a way that -  for the reasons mentioned above -  organized they did not 
come forward as caucuses in the elections, and they only later transformed into 
parliamentary parties. If we examine their numerical proportions, we get the following 
distribution: the consrevative group numbered about 20 persons, but this did not 
actually constitute an independent party at the time, rather a group which wanted the 
compromise and would carry it through; it was a political ally of the 180-members Deâk
2Ibid. p.407.
'ibid, pp.425-426.
4Skorpiô (Csâvolszky, L.: Röpirat a vâlasztôkhoz -  Pamphlet for the Voters. Pest. 1869.)
Szàsz, /... Egy képviselo naplôjegyzctci (Memoranda of an M.P.) Pest, 1866.
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party. Some 94 persons belonged to the force led by Kaiman Tisza in opposition to the 
given form of the compromise total ly and categorically.6 The latter -  on the basis of the 
place they occupied in the house of representatives -  received the appellation ’’extreme 
left”. From 1868 they referred themselves as the ”48” party indicating thereby that they 
wished firmly to adhere to national autonomy. The parliamentary proportions however 
-  precisely because of the circumstances of the elections, the ’’delayed provision of 
information -  by no menas reflected the political ruling within the circle of those 
entitled to voter. (And here it has not even been mentioned how those not entitled to 
vote might have thought. In any case it was significant, that the political powers which 
put the Compromise system into operation were rigidly opposed to extension of the 
franchise, which indicates that they had reason to fear for their position of authority, 
were democratic rights expanded.) That the 1848 independent opposition doubled the 
number of their mandats up to 1869 and that the camp of the center left proclaiming 
support, also increased confirm too. To this we also must add that in the formation of 
public opinion and in the propagation of thei position, the opportunities of the political 
forces in the center ring were by no means equal. The absolutist system, now expiring 
but still half existing in the course of the establishing of constitutionalism, offered the 
least possiblitiy of publicizing their opinion precisely to those most resolutely opposed 
to the bargain which was being struck. Thus for example the possiblitiy of publishing 
their own independent press organ, the Magyar Ùjsâg (Hungarian News), opened to 
the ”48” party only from the end of March 1867, therefore when the unhindered 
acceptance of the whole of the Compromise had already become completely certain.
Actually, the parliamentary discussion of the Compromise made public the domestic 
political polarization. Here those political formulations and nations, which arose by the 
Spring of 1867 with the preparation of the Compromise, coned contest openly for the 
first time.
Different Conceptions
It is understandable that an intense discussion broke out. It was thus even though at 
the time there was nothing to be won in the clash of arguments, for the subject was an 
already decided and even legislatively overguaranteed issue. With all of this, it is not 
altogether uninteresting for us what considerations the opponent and supporters of the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise thought it worthwile to raise in defense of their 
positions. For the fate of our theme, the military question, the intense emotions which 
rose up around it were determined by the political conception which formed the basis 
for the various political forces and groupings’ acceptance or rejection of the Com-
6Cf. Jozsef Madarâsz, Emlékirataim 1831-1881 (Memoirs 1831-1881) Budapest. 1883. Daniel Ivânyi, 
Mcgjcgyzésck Mađar,-is?. Jôzsef emlćkiralaioz (Notes on the memoirs of Jozsef Madanisz) Budapest, 1994. 
Toldy. /.: Öt év tôrténetc 18671872 (The history of five years, 1867-1872) Pest, 1872. Mariez, P.: A magyar 
orszâggyiîlési pârtok küzdelmei a koronâzâstôl a Dcâk és balkôzép pârtokegybeolvadâsâig. 1867-1872 (The 
struggles of the parliamentary panics from the coronation until the merger of the Deâk and center- left partes. 
1867-1872) Budapest, 1892. Kecskcméthy Aurćl naploja 1851-1878 (Aurel Kecskeméthy’s diary 1851 
1878) printed by Miklôs Rôzsa Budapest 1909.
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promise. Here we will understandably only bring up those elements which politically 
exerted a direct influence on the common defense.7
In this regard the most important was the general perception in connection with the 
Austrian situation. The assesment of parliament was unanimous, independent of party 
position. Everyone saw the Empire to be in crisis. Among the causes of the crisis the 
gigantic state debt arising from the maintenance of the absolutist system up to that point, 
as well as the political-military consequences of the competition with Prussia over 
German unity, plays a role. The economis collapse arising from the domestic political 
system threatened Austria, because the overbureaucratic system built on force was so 
expensive that in fact in the economic sense it was not worth maintaining. Following 
from this, she would only be able to recover economically from the debts which had 
grown in extraordinary measure if she made political consessions. (Let us not forget 
that the state debt tripled between 1848 and 1867!) The change of domestic political 
system represented the only possibility for halting the series of losses suffered in the 
international arena or at least for them to do everything hinder further political and 
military failures.
The difference between the Hungarian political forces also stammed from the fact 
that in this crisis one force regarded the possibility of becoming independent as 
desirable, the other the unity with the Empire enforced by the Compromise. For the 
representatives of independence primarily interests could and did serve as reference 
points, because independente statehood was a self-evident assertion for 19th-century 
liberal nationalism. The supporters of unity regarded the realization of national interests 
through mediation as the proper road, because a Dualistic Hungary represented a 
strengthening of the Empire. And in this way, with Hungarian participation, the ’’Great- 
Power” status of the Monarchy, which had been shaken by Italian and German strivings 
for unity, could be kept up. In teh eyes of the believers in Compromise therefore the 
Austrian Great-powr position was both maintainable and necessary for Hungary: 
Maintainable, because in their opinion an Austria fulfilling the role of countervailing 
power in the Eastem-European area was indispensable. Necessary, for to Hungary it 
represented defence against the expansionary strivings of Prussia and the ’’Colossus of 
the East”, Russia.8 If by becoming involved in international conflicts Austria should
7The parliamentary debate material examine here in connection with the Compromise extends from the end 
of November. 1866 -  from the resumption of parliamentary activity interrupted because of the Prussian- 
Austrian war -  until the end of March, beginning of April of 1867, until the constitutional acceptance of the 
meritorius principles of the Compromise, i.e. the acceptance by majority opinion of the 67-member 
parliamentary committee preparing the agreements. For the debate materials see: Az 1865-1868. évi 
orszâggyulés képvisclôhâzânak naplôja III., IV. kotel. (The Journal of the 1865-1868 Parliament House of 
Representatives, vols. III. and IV. Hereafter cited as 1865/68 K.N.)
8This was not a notion of recent origin, for in the earlier periods of the 19th century a "dual fear" was 
organically built into Hungarian political thinking. The fear concerning efforts at Germanisation was based 
on serious historical experiences. Russia's expansionary efforts on the other hand received special sig­
nificance because the Tsarist Empire, carrying out pan-slavic propaganda, strove to exploit for its own 
purposes the awakening of national consciousness of the numerous Slavic nationalities living in Hungary. 
As a result, even the territorial integrity of the country was threatened. And whereas the intervenionist Tsarist 
armies withdraw from Hungary (their remaining here did not even arise as a possibility) nevertheless they 
made the Hungarian feel for the first time directly the military pressure of the Russian Empire.
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lose, Hungary would still represent a consolidated and compact power, which would 
have to be reckoned with in any political reordening. In this way Hungarian supremacy 
could be maintained even in the event of Austrian defeat. It was in Hungary’s interest 
therefore, that she join in the restoration of Austria’s position in the given crisis 
situation. Since unity with the Hungarians was for the Monarchy a question of (its very) 
existence, this aided Austria in awakening to her own interest. In the final result, even 
if indirectly, this represented for Hungarians the winning back of constitutional in­
dependence. They saw that the danger of Austria’s collapse continued, but they thought 
that it would only happen withforeign, Great Power intervention. The intervention of 
External powers would not necessarily represent Hungarian interests. The danger of 
this was concretely formulated in the form of a question: ”Is such a case impossible, in 
which powers opposed to the maintenance of the Empire might ally themselves in such 
a way, that the price would be separation of Transylvania-perhaps up to the Tisza- from 
Hungary and the ruling house, and its annexation to another state?”9 Therefore in this 
connection, too, it was better if there were a compromise, for only this way would the 
Territorial integrity of the country be safeguarded.
Those manifestations which also agreed with the maintenance of Austria as a great 
power demonstrated the internal contradiction of this concept; they also saw that it was 
too close, and exactly for that reason possible only at the price of assuming uncomfort­
able commitments. As the schizophrenia of the situation, was coneived: ”We will be 
reduced to attempting to escape from those commitments which we now take upon 
ourselves and will get into a situation in which we -  a country of 6000 square miles 
and 12 million inhabitants -  will be forced to envy the political position of Serbia and 
the Danubian principalities.”10 *
The Austrian crisis represented fundamentally different political consequences and 
inferences to the ‘independent’ opposition, that in Europe Austria had more enemies 
than friends and, among other reasons therefore, the compromise would be favourable 
to her. The Hungarian nation, on the other hand, should seize upon exactly that moment 
to separate from Austria after Königgratz, and at the most to recognize as common the 
person of the ruler. With the advent of the compromise, the nation’s room to maneuver 
would be circiumscribed and thereby the possibilities of concluding agreements con­
forming to national interests would be constricted. The Compromise ’’will cast the die 
of our fate. It will ruin constitutional life in hour homeland, rob it of its essence and 
strip it of the elements of life. The associated countries and nationalities will provoke 
a battle of interests against us, and this will make difficult their coming to an agreement 
with the Hungarian people. It is in the interest neither of a people nor of a neighbouring 
state to join forces closely with a nationa which refuses to be the independent master 
of its own voice, fate, future, autonomy, and freedom -  and which nation satisfies itself 
with the fatters of constitutionalism.”"
It was completely clear to them that of the three great unsolved questions of Europe
91865/68 K.N.Vol. III.p.96.
I01865/68 K.N.Vol. IV. p.41.
Magyar Ujsâg (Hungarian News) 4th April, 1867.
HUNGARIAN POLITICAL CONFLICTS CONCERNING THE MILITARY 167
-the  Eastern, the Polish, and the Hungarian -  the coming into being of the compromise 
would remove the Hungarain from the agenda, because ”if you don’t help youself, God 
won’t help either Europe is continuously and exclusively the friend of faits ac­
complis.”12
Now the internati independent opposition also recognized certain fundamental 
European processes. Among the possible combinations the European vision belonged 
to Kossuth, who lived in exile and passionately rejected the compromise. He would 
complete the interpretation of the consequences as being a complete system. He saw 
that with the help of Hungary Austria would ’’galvanize her powers”, and this would 
make it a desirable alliance for France, who was working to hinder Prussian expansion. 
This would result in Hungary’s becoming entangled in the war against Prussia on 
Austria’s side. In the same way, the Austrian alliance would be exactly that ’’which 
would bring the Russian bear down on our necks.” In the Eastern question, furthermore, 
the people living there could not remain neutral between the nascent Austro-Hungarian 
Dual Monarchy and Russia. They would stand on the Russian side, since the Russians 
could show the picture of Great Serbia to the Serbs, of Illyria to the Croats, and of Dacia 
to the Rumanians. The Eastern question, however, ’’was not a question of peaceful 
development. It is the sort of question on account of which a world will wallow in 
blood.”13
The essence of his mental process was that it was precisely the compromise which 
’’closed down” Hungary's possibilities. She could legally be entangled in armed 
conflicts which did not serve her interests, and which by means of the compromise she 
wished to avoid.
With reference to the consolidated, compact, ’’preservable” Hungary pictured by the 
Compromise, Kossuth was of the opinion that the responsibility of Hungary in wars 
tought on the side of Austria would prove to be stronger than any claim she coul make 
to special treatment after her defeat. She would not appear as an autonomous factor, 
but rahter as a ’’prey, which the victors would possess.” Not much useful would come 
out of it -  opined Kossuth -  even if Austria should emerge victorious from the conflicts, 
because she would ’’squash Hungary to death” with the strength of her enhanced power. 
Therefore Kossuth brought before Ded к’s eyes that with the compromise he was leading 
Hungary to a point, where ’’she would no longer be the master (lord) of here future”. 
The imperial unit brought into being with the compromise not only would not rescue 
-  it would at most prolong -  a monarchy condemned to dissolution it would also bring 
with it the breaking up of Hungary as well because of the responsibility which it made 
common. When Kossuth wrote about the unsolved questions of Europe, he said that 
the solution also depended on the attitude of the given nations. He therefore held the 
compromise to be a decisive political mistake, because with it the possibility that 
Hungary could stand permanently in the forefront, of European diplomacy was closed. 
He wished to preserve for Hungary factors which could not be ignored in the eyes of
121865/68 K.N.Vol. IV. p.41.
1 ’Kossuth Lajos iratai (The writings of Lajos Kossuth) prepared for publication by Ferenc Kossuth, vol.VH. 
Budapest 1908. p.337. Hereafter cited as KL1.
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the great powers. The time factor had a large role, because Austria could do two things 
with a Hungary which did not make a deal : either step up the repression, the assimilation 
efforts and adhere to centralisation -  the result of which would be the military and 
financial bankruptcy of the exhausted monrachy -  or else abandon her ’’politics of 
greatness” and give much freer play than did the compromise to national self- 
deteremination and constitutionalism.
Since the aim was on the one hand to leave the Hungarian que: ’’open”, but the other 
to seek alliances which would in other internal and external political ways render 
solvable the problem of the Austrian and the powerful vacuum arising out of possible 
independence from the Monarchy; the idea of union offered itself to the nationalities, 
or rather to the adjacent smaller states, the ethnic group related to the nationalities. The 
anti-Austrian policy motivated the necessity for Austrai ’’opposes the interests of every 
one of the nationalities which bear the yoke of absolutism.14
Good relations with the neighbouring states could provide insurance against Russian 
expansion, but it could only become possible if the Slavic ring around Hungary did not 
become a pan-slavic ring, a basis for Russian conquest. The Western great powers 
would assist in the defence against Russian expansive desires, and it could not be 
ignored that the extension of liberal law could offer more to these people than could 
the absolutism of the Tsarist empire.15 Kossuth formulated this political notion as 
follows: ”We are called to that work whose task it is to propound and stabilize the 
vigorous formation of freedom and the peaceful coexistence of people in the Danube 
basin.”16
Austria -  since she did not stand on this platform -  had to represent the priniple of 
conquest, Hungary -  holding to her own interests -  fraternity.
Neither did the domestic independet opposition draw the necessary conclusions in 
connection with the nationalities. Because of the reasons enumerated above it adhered 
to the completeners of the autonomous right of defence in the name of nationality 
representation and at the same time -  in concert with the Kossuthian formulation -  
declared that ’’not general armament, but general peace is the duty of every nation. War 
is the interest of Absolution.”17
It is recognised that Law XII of 1867 -  the compromise -  in its essence fixed that 
content which Deâk expounded in May of 1865. In this sense it did not simply reserve 
to itself the commonality of defence, but in matters military, it left the right of command 
virtually in its entirety in the hands of the ruler. With this it made possible an 
extraordinarily grave absolutist influence within the confines of the only recently
i4KLI vol.VII, p.319.
Kossuth worked out his conception of a desirable nationalities policy and alliance system on the basis of 
the experiences of the 1848/49 war of self-defence. The constitutional plan formulated in 1851 and the 1862 
plan of Danubian alliance are instructive on this. Sec Szcmelvények abszolutizmukori és dualizmuskori 
magyar tôrténcti forrâsokbôl (Selections from Hungarain historical sources from the time of absolutism and 
Dualism) compiled by György Szabad. Budapest 1974.
I6KLI. vol.VII, p.323. See also Szabad. Gy.: Kossuth politika! pâlyâja ismert ésismeretlen megnyilatkozäsai 
tükrében. p .189- 199. (Kossuth’s political career as reflected in its know and unknow manifestations) 
pp.189-199. Budapest, 1977.
Ί865/68 K.N. vol.IIl, p.244.
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enlivened constituionalism. The defence bills containing the details, however, came 
before the parliament -  and therewith before the body politic -  more than a year after 
the concluding of the Compromise. About their acceptance, given the parliamentary 
power relations, no doubts could arise. Different conceptions -  sketched above -  
clashed extraordinarily violently, for the concretization of the commonality of the army 
was and remained with alll certainty the most sensitive point of national self-determina­
tion.
T h e D eb ate  over  the D efen se  B ill
Putting the military question in order was an urgent task of those in power: this was 
partly for international partly for internal political reasons. The course of German unity 
was not yet closed off, and who could have been able to say unambigously what the 
future would bring, when there would again be need of a combatworthy army.
So even if Vienna was forced into concessions, she did not have to overstep the 
bounds of what she could bear.
At the same time the general European military development itself made certain 
alterations necessary and timely in the military area. How to put military matters vitally 
occupied the national public opinion already in 1867. The national guard units, which 
were not simply instruments for defence of interests, but which served as a forum for 
sharp discussions. Their paper, A Honvéd (The National Guardaman) regurarly 
published exhaustive studies which argued the right to existence and necessity of an 
independent army.'* The social pressure for an independent Hungarian military forces, 
for the establishment of a national guard was so strong that not a single responsible 
government official in Hungary willing to disregard it. Therefore however much 
someone pledged himself to the common army, he had in some way to make soon fot 
these demands. Naturally this had to mean concessions on the part of Vienna, but the 
planned size and quality of the independently commanded military force, and its 
position relative to the common army, made the national guard a symbolis, rather than 
a real, force. It was not therefore not truly necessary to make a basic concession but 
rather merely to take account of the sensitivy of the Hungarain side.8 920
Finally the government, having prepared its draft biIIs, presented them to the military
l8Forexample national guard lieutenant colonel Kâroly Hauser’s article is of this type. Észrevételek a magyar 
honvédelem szervczésérc. (Observations on the structure of Hungarian national defence A Honvéd/The 
National Guardsman) no. 13. 1867 28th October
l9Ede Wertheimer has written up the discussions carried on with Vienna in the question of the national guard: 
Grüf Andrâssy Gyula élete és kora I. kötet p.390-446. (The life and times of Count Gyula Andrâssy vol.I. 
Budapest. 1910. pp.390-446.) He also gives an account of pamphlets concerning the defence force.
20In this respect the famous Grivicic affair of March, 1868 in characteristic. The imperial general of Croation 
origin spoke only of a unitary imperial army, withwhich he called in question the common character o f the 
army and military affairs. The indignation in Hungary was so great that two days later the common defence 
minister, Baron Kukn, in the form of a statement publicly dissociated himself from Grivicic’s declaration. 
See: A közös iigyek târgyalâsâra a magyar orszâggyulés âltal kiküldött bizottsdg jegyzdkönyve p.I53-157. 
(Minutes of the committee dcspatcched by the Hungarian parliament to the conference on common affairs. 
Vienna, 1868. pp. 155-157. On the general attitude of the Austrian side, see Zachar. J.: Az osztrâk-német 
liberâlis Alkotmânypârt és a politikai hatalom 1861-1881 (Austor-German political power and liberal 
constitutional party) 1861-1881. Budapest. 1981.
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committee o f  the parliament, and the question came before the house at the end o f July, 
1X68."' Even before this, however, viewpoints concerning the defence question 
received free play in the press."
Firstly, the government’s arguments introduced the question o f a common arm y as 
the logical consequence o f the compromise; secondly, they regarded the aligument o f 
international relations as authoritative, thirdly, they drew up a modernization o f the 
army structu re with the introduction o f universal conscription. For them, the size o f  
Russian, East, German (Prussian) and Fcrnch armies justified m aintaining that a 
standing army o f 80000 men (not counting the border guards) w as necessary for the 
M onarchy.’ 1 T h is viewpoint follow s front the political conception -  sketched above 
which judged Great Power status to be necessary and desired to strengthen it.
It is not worthwhile to spend too many words on how the common army followed 
from the Com prom ise, because there defence, was accepted as a principle, or rather the 
com m onality o f defence and the absolute right o f the ruler with respect to the structure 
command, and leadership often army. Thus the common army was an unam bigous 
result of the Com promise, and there could really be littcl discussion -  if  this question 
could even arise-about it. That the acceptance of this meant a difficult -  to digest 
experience for many members o f the government party was o f course a different 
question. Here to be sure it was necessary concretely to confront the relinguishing o f 
one o f the most essential elements of national -state sovereignity; they had a bitter pill 
to swallow. It is a fact that the m ilitary was that point where the ruler alw ays stuck most 
strictly to his rights o f  feudal origin, and being a person who could neither be replaced 
nor held to account -  he regularlycarried out his w ill. He did not permit much 
constitutional, let alone national, intervention in the m ilitary matters w h ich he regarded 
as the basis o f his authority. In this regard there was for the Hungarian, political leading 
stratum a two-sided basic experience: the one represented 1848/49, the other the 18 
years o f Absolutism  which followed. The self- defence struggle o f 1848/49 first showed 
as a pan- national experience the importance o f an army lighting for national self-deter­
mination. It may be said that this was an experience or observation in comparison with 
w hich -  independently o f political position -  the Compromise could only represent a 
backward step. On the other hand, the other basic experience, the 18 vears ol 
nationalism, made acknowledgment o f the backward step difficult. It brought with it 
exactly that lesson, İhatan army on which the nation has no influence and w hich belongs
"’For documents in connection with the delence law. sec А/. 1865. ćvi december 10-dikćrc It irdelet I 
ors/àggyulés képvisclôha/anak iromânyai V. kotel l’est. 1868. 262 .262.264. 2УЗ-2У4. 2УХ s/amok alati. А /  
clfogadtott lorvények pedig а / 1868,'XL XI.I XLI1 torvénycikkek. (Documents of the House of Rcpresenia- 
tivesof the Parliament convoked on 10th December 1865. vol.V. nos.264. 263. 262. 2УЗ-2У4. and 2У8. 'Hie 
laws passed wer nos XL. Xl.l and XI II of 1868
"  Front this viewpoints it is worthwhile to follow with attention the articles which appeared in the summer 
of 1868 in A Hon ( Hie Fatherland). Haztink (Our Homeland). Pasti Napio (Pest Diary) and Magyar lljxiig 
(Hungarian News)
" According to the dale Russia and a regular army numbering 827.350 men. a local militia of 410.427 and 
an reserve army of 22У.223. Iltc data of the Fast Herman Alliance: Regular army. 843.3У4 national guard 
army (bindwcltr) 185552: and beyond that an allied army of 200.171 men on the basis of a treaty concluded 
with the South German stales. In France the regular army had 800.000 men and the 50(1.000 home guards 
supplemented that.
HUNGARIAN POLITICAL CONFLICTS CONCERNING THE MILITARY 171
exclusively in Ibe sphere of the ruler’s authority is an instrument of national repression. 
And that did not figure as a logical possiblitiy, but as an experience bitterly undergone. 
So, while someone could with calm spirit be pleased in general about the Compromise 
and political consolidation, at the same time he would in considetable measure become 
nervous if bed had to confront the army with the resolution of the Compromise. György 
Klapka, at that time a government party M.R, lived through this dual basic experience 
as an enthusiastic believer in the Compromise. All the way until Octorber of 1849 (so 
two months beyond the surrender of the Hungarian army) he held the fortress of 
Komarom and then was forced to emigrate. Now when he had to defend the military 
solution following from the Compromise, which he also supported, he said the follow­
ing: ”Llet us state the situation... In Vienna, at no price do they want to set out the unity 
of the army as the touchstone of Dualism. And we are in such a position, that we can 
not force them to do it.”"1 But Ferenc De;ik himself formulated something similar when 
he said: ”We have to regard the situation as not being presently as we would desire it.”25 
These manifestations reflected rather cynical acquiescenc than identification with it.
Baron Jozsef Eötvös, minister of religion and education, put four questions:
1. Is it our interest that the Monarchy be capable of defence and able to safeguard 
its Great Power position?
2. Are the instruments of draft legislation necesasry for this?
3. Would not the acceptance of the draft bill put intolerable burdens on the nation?
4. Does the acceptance of the draft bill endanger the independence of Hungary?
The answer to the first two questions was ”yes”. In could not be otherwise, because
only this answer could come out of the political conception discussed in the previous 
section. Alter that, however the answer to the other two questions had to be ”no”. 
Although the desired 329.632 men to be enlisted from the lands of the Hungarian crown 
was a heavy import for the nationa, they had to be subordinated to the greater interest, 
contributing to the continuation of the Empire. Though all this did not mean complete 
independence, in its effect -  as the whole of the Compomise -  it would nevertheless 
ensure il.'< They fancied they could satisfied the demands for an autonomous armed 
force with the establishment of a national guard which was far, far behind the common 
army in both numbers and equipment, which anyway could only be present in the 
military structure ”as a supplementary part of the common army.” Former national 
guard general Mor Perczel, an ardent member of the government party, also brought 
up that for the personnel of the standing army the actual period »I'm Hilary service would 
be reduced with the supplementation based on universal conscription. In total thev had 
to serve three years in the common army, in contrast to the eight years in force since 
the 1850s.
In consequence of its basic political standpoint, the independent opposition rejected 
the whole of the draft bill, but attempted to point out the pitfalls within the bill as well.
' 11S65/6X K.N. IX. p.24?
;51S65/6X K.N. IX p.367.
Al thegiven time this represented 82 battalionsof infantry and 32 companiesol cavalry ol which 4 battalions 
md 4 companies were stationed in Croatia.
172 ANDRÂS GERO
One of the basis interests on which the refusal rested was national independence. It was 
superflous to go into this in detail, partly because it had already come up partly because 
in this respect they could add nothing new to their view. The army critique based on 
democratic values is much more instructive. From experience, the point of departure 
was that ’’the regular army”, in all times and places with in general very rare exceptions, 
is always the servant of power, but it is the guardian of the constitution only if the 
authorities hold it necessary to keep the constitution.”27 Since in this way the power of 
the executive authority would grow, it was necessary to oppose it: ’’however much 
power governments demand for their princes, the people have todemand just as much 
power for their parliaments, in order to insure against transgressions by the one or the 
other, and thus against the errors and transgressions of states and princes.”28 The draft 
bill, however, would not simply increase the power of the executive authority (and 
within that also the absolutistic element), but even would reduce the jursidiction of the 
legislative -  representative organ, for it would determine the number of military 
personnel for 10 years in advance and thereby render the parliamentary right to vote 
recruits illusory. From all of this it follows that executive authority would acquire an 
enormous internal political weapon in the form of a large standing army, which in case 
of need it could employ against its own inhabitants.
The linking together of liberal democracy and national autonomy meant scrapping 
the entire bill. Indeed, but the demand for modernization, the introduction of universal 
conscription, the ensuring of a permanent capability so necessary to the modernization 
of the army were an unavoidable problem and the government built all of these into its 
bill.
In this respect the reaction of the opposition was heterogenous. In part they accepted 
these principles, in part however, they wished to apply them modified in both content 
and form. They judged universal conscription lawful when the extension of obligations 
also meant an extension of rights: ’The democratic principle also requires, that 
obligations can be placed only on those who enjoy rights. Equal rights, equal obliga­
tions -  this is the pure, irrefutable principle of democracy.” So the expansion of 
obligations has to be paired with the extension of rights -  and here we speak of the rigth 
to vote.
On the other hand, since they fundamentally differed conceptual from the govern­
ment in their judgement of the country’s external political interests, they sought a 
solution which would provide in an altered form the military advantages offered by 
universal conscitpion but which would not go along with the maintenance of the large 
standing army which was for them unjustified. Therefore they desired a small army in 
peacetime; meanwhile they also wanted to realize the most extensive training by 
including it in the educational system. Here they referred to Kossuth and to Lajos 
Aulich, the national guard general who died a martyr’s death in 1849. First they cited 
Kossuth: ”1 would integrate national defence into the public education system. Already 
in the primary school I would instruct the children in the elements of the task of national
271865/68 K.N. IX. p.292.
28Ibid. p.291.
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defence, and would have them practice military movements, as 1 have seen in practice 
not just in one place, especially in America.
I would make national idefence training a part of the public education system 
everywhere, throught the higher classes as well. I would only keep as much of a standing 
army, consisting entirely of volunteers, as could serve to train the entire nation in military 
service, for which with such a preparation one year would be perfect enough and would 
not ruin anyone’s civilian career.” From Aulich however, they took over the following 
thought: ”if one time the time of peacefull organization arrives, let us not raise a dividing 
wall between soldier and civilian; national defence is the most noble civil duty; let us not 
strip this out of the character of citizen ship, otherwise there will be a military state in the 
state, a warrior caste, a danger to freedom, a curse to the commonwealth.”"4 That is, they 
strove to have the demand for modernity attached to democracy and to realize all if this 
within the confines of national autonomy. In this connection, America possessed exemplary 
value for them, as one of them formulate it: ’’Indeed I want civilian soldiers, like the glorious 
sons of North America, who know they are soldiers only when they face the enemy; while 
otherwise peace finds the upper and lower ranks, the fanner, the craftsman, the merchant 
and the artist, again at the pervious occupations, which they only recently left. I want the 
military spirit to be moderated by the civilian spirit.29 30 324
The democratic integration of the anny into a society possessing national autonomy 
represents at the same time the most certain guara of successful functioning in a situation 
of crisis. It is an enormous drawing power if the men’s activity in the army is directly 
attachable to the defence of their achievements and interests. This was a newer reinforcing 
factor for their own concept and at the same time a new basis for attack on the draft bill, 
for ’’the two most powerful states of the whole world, England and North America, whose 
vast empires occupy half the globe, taken together do not have as many armies as Austria; 
and still from where did North America produce a valient, million-strong anny in one year? 
Didn’t this show that they didn’t need an 800.000 man regular anny with decades of 
experience kept on a war footing at a cost of 100 millions and led by helpless incompetent 
Mcthuselaks? But these not a people desiring foreign territory, but one defending its own 
freedom and independence, was victorious over defending its own freedom and 
independence, was victorious over the masters of slavery.”54







For the relative numbers concerning origin sec Preradovich, N. Die Führungsschichten in Österreich und in 
Preussen (1804-1918) pp.56-57. Wiesbaden 1955. Péter Напек: Λ dualizmus vélâsâgnak probléméi In 
Magyarorszâg a Monarchiàban pp.238-239. Budapest, 1976. (The problems o ferisi of Dualism) In Hungary 
in the Monrachy Hieszler, V: Albrecht foherccg és az Osztrâk- Magyar Monarchia külpolitikâja 1866-1882 
pp.29-32. Bp. 1977. (Archduke Albrecht and the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 1866— 
1882) doctoral dissertation. The data to be found in these works cast light also on the fact that the bulk of the 
Germans were not even Austrian.
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army, the solution the government wanted to realize lacked both. It carried within itself 
only adherence to the dynasty and to imperial statehood. They raised the question: 
’’What is this Austria? A state like the moon, it waxes and wanes. In recent times it has 
usually waned. Austria is not the kind of idea or common home where love of country 
binds our citizens to it with all those ties which alone make it possible that they be 
aroused to fervour when an enemy threatens the structure of the state.” Did the Italians 
in Lombardy and Venetia feel any pain because of separation? In contrast to this, 
national identity was so strong that-and here Poland was the exam ple-”it was broken 
up and these pieces up to the present day long for each other like the children of a 
common mother and await the moment, when they could return to her bosom.”32 
So therefore imperial statehood promised to be precious conscious unifying force in 
contrast to nationaol endeavours, and the same thing could be said about the fading 
power of dynastic identity as well. Since these identification possibilities -  in com­
parison with the national-democratis solution -  were so weak in practice, they had to 
build in those elements which give the officer corps an identity, but which force the 
men into a discipline which is by no means undertaken with justifiable interest. They 
had to insure dynastic loyalty on the part of the officer corpswith privileges, social 
prestige, and the preservation of feudal elements. And more than loyalty: identify. Thus 
this officer corps-viewing it as a whole-was ’’the unconditional servant of reaction”. 
Its political principle was ’’the Emperor is my father the army my mother.”33 The 
mentality of the army determinated all. But with the enlisted men -a s  every exclusively 
dynastic element -  this realized feudal subjection, which was more than mere dis­
cipline: it was stark social subjection. It only aggrevated this basic motif that in the 
given situation the officer corps was mostly foreign ethnically as well: ”In the Austrian 
army 5% of the entire officar corps is of Hugnarian birth, 95% were Austrian.” Viewing 
the foregoing the situation was even worse however, because ”in the
corps of higher -  ranking officers only one -  quearter (0,25) percent are Hungarain, 
and in the highest ranks a Hungarian is only one in a thousand and it is mostly his 
political value which put him in the high rank.”33
The ethnic viewpoint, however, is only a colouring element here and not the essence. 
The preservation of feudal content among modernized forms represented socially and 
politically the gratest danger to democratic national self-realization. It could also 
become a real danger, that the army be infiltrated as an alien body into the society, and 
be employable against it. It should constitute a caste which does not regard its own 
existence as service, but demands for itself unconditional precedence over everything 
else. The independent opposition fully recognized this fact with its basic, far reching 
consequences.
Naturally many things cropped up in the course of the debate: the given form of the 
large standing army would be much more expensive -  which was evident anyway — 
than national defence built on the expression of democratic principles; also what the 
solution coming into being would mean in connection with the nationalities. On the 
whole, however, this did not modify the picture which has been formed. While one side 
voted with the conservative assertion of national interest prevailing through imperial 
consciousness paired with modernization, the other desired modernization in the name
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of national and democratic interests. At the level of argument, this represented a genuine 
confrontation, in spite of the fact that there was no question of equal sides in terms of 
stemght. This does not deduct anything from the power of the minority argument 
however, for they pointed out numerous elements and represented numerous values, 
that proved to be much more durable than the views professed by those currently in 
power. The picture we form of the period would be very schematic, if we regarded the 
forces which at that time had won power as the single and exclusive bearers of the 
historical process. Because the liberal-democratic road of national independence was 
never permanently realized, it is not permissible for us to exclude efforts directed 
toward it. In part, because we would thereby make the past one -sided, in part, however, 
that we should not see the defeated experiments as failures. This viewpoint is basic and 
influences the judgement of the whole development in 19th and 20th century East- 
European history. And it appears that it loses nothing of its validity.
In the defence force debate, as with other occasions, the possibility of the tragedy 
of a bad decision flashes out: ”... it remained out of consideration, that if the continuing 
passage of time breaks the power of the bayonets, then desires for dissolution will break 
out with greater shock. And what will then become of Hungary whose defence system, 
collapsing due to the bad structure, compromised the nation?”35
The tragedy of a bad decision is of course not immediately obvious. It took around 
60 years and a lost World War for this decision to cam its historical classification. Not 
merely those who bore the responsibility for it paid the price of its tragic misguidedness, 
however, nor did only the Hungarians, but the entire East European area.
(1986)
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